A. Introduction and Executive Summary
1. The Government has recently announced its proposal on the border control arrangementsand jurisdictional matters in relation to the Mainland-Hong Kong Express Rail Link(“XRL”). In short, the Government proposes a co-location arrangement of border andcustoms control facilities at West Kowloon Station and the Mainland to have criminal jurisdiction to be exercised at some areas of West Kowloon Station and on all operating trains.
2. The Progressive Lawyers Group (“PLG”) is of the view that such proposal is in clear and direct contravention of numerous provisions of the Basic Law, in particular, Articles 17, 18, 19 and 22. We set out our position as follows.
B. The Spirit of the Basic Law
3. The Preamble of the Basic Law states that the establishment of the HKSAR and the promulgation of the Basic Law are to implement the “basic policies of the People’s Republic of China regarding Hong Kong” which “have been elaborated by the Chinese Government in the Sino-British Joint Declaration” under the principle of “one country, two systems”.
4. Article 3(2) & (3) of and Annex 1 to the Sino-British Joint Declaration further states that Hong Kong enjoys “a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People’s Government” and be vested “with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged“. Article 1 of the Sino-British Joint Declaration also defines “Hong Kong” indivisibly and without qualification as “including Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories”.
5. The concept of “One Country Two Systems” does not only preserve the socio-political systems previously practiced in Hong Kong, but also represents an express recognition that the PRC and the Hong Kong legal systems are rooted in fundamentally distinct normative values. The Hong Kong system emphasises governance through law which entails: (1) the functional separation of powers between the executive, legislative and the judiciary; and (2) constitutionally protected fundamental rights.
6. The National People’s Congress as empowered by Article 31 of the PRC Constitution therefore established the HKSAR by adopting the Basic Law in 1990 as a piece of national law, which expounds the above fundamental policy of “Hong Kong People administering Hong Kong”.
7. The high degree of autonomy conferred upon Hong Kong is enshrined in numerous provisions in the Basic Law.1 It is only in areas such as foreign affairs 2and the defence of Hong Kong against armed attack that the Central Government has direct jurisdiction over Hong Kong. 3
C. Meanings and Effects of Articles 17, 18, 19 and 22
8. Articles 17, 18, 19 and 22 of the Basic Law are provisions under Chapter II which governs the relationship between the Central Government and Hong Kong.
C.1 Article 17
9. Article 17 of the Basic Law (and also Article 3(3) of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Part II of Annex 1 thereto) provides that the HKSAR shall be vested with legislative power. 4 Although laws enacted by the legislature of Hong Kong must be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPCSC“) for record, such reporting shall not affect the entry into force of such laws. The NPCSC may only return the law in question but not amend it if it considers, after consultation with the Committee for the Basic Law, that such law does not conform with the provisions of the Basic Law (1) regarding affairs within the responsibility of the Central Government; or (2) regarding the relationship between the Central Government and the HKSAR.
10. Hence, even the NPCSC cannot legislate for Hong Kong. The NPCSC may only return law which does not conform with the Basic Law and are regarding (1) affairs within the responsibility of the Central Government; or (2) the relationship between the Central Government and the HKSAR.
11. Article 17 therefore reinforces Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy and the principle of “One Country Two Systems” by vesting Hong Kong with legislative power which even the NPCSC cannot supplant.
C.2 Article 18
12. Article 18 of the Basic Law clearly sets out the law to be applied in the HKSAR:
(1) Article 18(1) (as in Article 8 of the Basic Law and Article 3(3) of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Part II of Annex 1 thereto), provides that the law previously in force in Hong Kong (including the common law and pre-existing legislation) remains in force.
(2) Article 18(2) provides that national laws shall not be applied to Hong Kong except for those listed under Annex III. Such national laws shall be applied only by way of local promulgation or legislation.
(3) Article 18(3) restricts the power of the NPCSC to apply national laws to Hong Kong via Annex III. First, the power is confined to apply national laws relating to: (i) defence; (ii) foreign affairs; and (iii) “other matters outside the limits of the autonomy of [the HKSAR] as specified by [the Basic] Law”. Secondly, national law is to be applied only after consultation with the HKSAR Government.
13. It is thus clear that national laws must not be applied in the HKSAR unless they relate to: (i) defence; (ii) foreign affairs; and (iii) “other matters outside the limits of the autonomy of [the HKSAR] as specified in [the Basic] Law”; and are included in Annex III and incorporated by local promulgation or legislation.
C.3 Article 19
14. Article 19 of the Basic Law (and Article 3(3) of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Part III of Annex 1 thereto) provides that the HKSAR shall be vested with independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The Courts of the HKSAR shall have jurisdiction over all cases in the Region, except (1) any restriction imposed by the legal system and principles previously in force in Hong Kong or (2) cases concerning acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs.
15. Such independent judicial power and the composition of the Judiciary is provided in detail in Articles 80 to 96, which allow foreign judges to sit in the Hong Kong Courts and allow Hong Kong Courts to refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions. Hong Kong Courts are only required under Article 158 to seek interpretation from the NPCSC on the relevant article of the Basic Law if the case in question concerns affairs which are (1) the responsibility of the Central Government, or which (2) concern the relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR.
16. Article 19 therefore also enshrines the principle of “One Country Two Systems” and provides jurisdiction to the Hong Kong Courts over all cases, whether criminal or civil, which occur within the HKSAR. To remove jurisdiction from the Hong Kong Courts and to confer the same to Courts of another region would be in direct contravention of Article 19.
C.4 Article 22
17. Article 22 provides that: (1) no department of the Central Government, province or municipality may interfere in the affairs which the HKSAR administers on its own in accordance with the Basic Law; and (2) all personnel and offices of the Central Government within the HKSAR must abide by the laws of Hong Kong.
18. The Chinese Constitution stipulates that the National People’s Congress is vested with all powers of the State. Even the executive authorities are established by, responsible to and subject to the supervision of the National People’s Congress. Given that the Basic law passed by the National People’s Congress is not only the mini-constitution of Hong Kong, but also national law, even the executive authorities of the Central Government must comply with the Basic Law and “shall not interfere in the affairs which the HKSAR administers on its own in accordance with this Law”.
19. Article 22, being a piece of national law, therefore clearly prohibits any officials of the Mainland, whether from any department of the Central Government or local government, from executing duties under or enforcing laws of the Mainland within the HKSAR.
C.5 Other Articles of the Basic Law
20. In addition to Articles 17, 18, 19 and 22, the following provisions of the Basic Law are also relevant and should also be read together:
(1) Articles 2 and 12 which provide that Hong Kong exercises a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power;
(2) Article 8, which states that “[t]he laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”;
(3) Articles 27 to 35, and 41, which guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents and persons within the HKSAR, including the rights against arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention or imprisonment, or torture (Article 28) and the rights to confidential legal advice and choice of lawyers for timely protection of their legal rights (Article 35);
(4) Article 39, which guarantees the application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) in Hong Kong including the right to fair hearing;
(5) Articles 106 and 108, which provides that the HKSAR shall practise an independent taxation system and the Central Government shall not levy taxes in the HKSAR;
(6) Article 116, which confirms that “[t]he Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a separate customs territory”;
(7) Article 154, which states that “[t]he Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may apply immigration controls on entry into, stay in and departure from the Region by persons from foreign states and regions”; and
(8) Article 159(4), which provides that “no amendment to [the Basic] Law shall contravene the established basic policies of the PRC regarding Hong Kong”, i.e. the basic policies as declared in the Preamble of the Basic Law and Annex 1 to the Sino-British Joint Declaration.
21. Reading and understanding all the above provisions of the Basic Law together, the only possible interpretation is that the HKSAR is established over the area of Hong Kong previously ruled by the British and is granted a high degree of autonomy, including the legislative power and independent judicial power, under the principle of “One Country Two Systems”. The Basic Law also guarantees all persons physically within the HKSAR their fundamental human rights, including the rights against arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and the rights to fair hearing.
D. Analysis of the Government’s Proposal
D.1 Violations of various Articles of the Basic Law
22. The Government proposes that certain areas of the three bottom levels of the West Kowloon Station to be leased out to the Mainland which would together with the operating train compartments form the Mainland Port Area (“MPA”). This arrangement is said to facilitate the border and customs control to be exercised by the Mainland officials on two of the bottom levels of the West Kowloon Station. PRC laws (except 6 areas of civil law governing e.g. contracts and insurance between MTR and passengers) will be applied in these areas and all operating trains within the HKSAR. In the exercise of such duties, the Mainland officials will have all powers under national law, including the power of arrest and detention and to transfer any arrested persons to the Mainland for further detention, investigation and potentially prosecution. The Mainland courts will have jurisdiction over all the matters in which PRC laws apply, i.e. including criminal Jurisdiction
23. As explained above, Articles 17 and 18 provide that Hong Kong is vested with legislative power and no national law can be applied in Hong Kong unless they concern defence, foreign affairs or “other matters outside the limits of the autonomy of [the HKSAR] as specified in [the Basic] Law”..
24. The Government’s proposal involves the exercise and practice of most national laws on certain levels of West Kowloon Station and all operating trains. Most of such laws do not concern defence or foreign affairs or any other matters that fall outside of Hong Kong’s autonomy. In particular, as noted above, Articles 8, 106, 108, 116 and 154 clearly states that pre-existing laws (which would include, amongst other things, criminal law), taxation (which would include the imposition of import duties and excises), customs and immigration controls are matters which fall squarely within Hong Kong’s autonomy.
25. As such:
(1) The scope of application of national laws in Hong Kong as now proposed by the Government in connection with the MPA go well beyond that which are currently applied in Hong Kong under Annex III of the Basic Law. Any attempt to impose national laws in the entirety or in any part of Hong Kong (the area of which is indivisible and unqualified under the Sino-British Joint Declaration) that are not already included in Annex III is contrary to Article 18 of the Basic Law and therefore unconstitutional.
(2) This unconstitutionality cannot be cured in the context of the MPA by seeking to add further national laws into Annex III of the Basic Law. The areas of national laws that are currently proposed to be imposed in the MPA are, as noted above, not matters that fall outside Hong Kong’s autonomy. Article 18(3) makes clear that only national laws that fall outside Hong Kong’s autonomy can be added to Annex III.
26. Moreover, Article 19 provides that Hong Kong is vested with independent judicial power and Hong Kong Courts have jurisdiction over all matters within the HKSAR. To remove jurisdiction in the designated areas within the boundary of the HKSAR and confer the same upon the Mainland authorities obviously violates Article 19.
27. Further, Article 22 provides that all departments of the Central Government, provinces and municipalities must not interfere with the self-administration of the affairs of the HKSAR and any such official must abide with the laws of Hong Kong when they are allowed to enter the HKSAR. Therefore allowing officials from the Mainland to exercise national laws in Hong Kong is in clear breach of Article 22.
28. In any event, the criminal law applied in the Mainland is fundamentally different from the criminal law of Hong Kong. The powers of arrest, detention and use of force exercisable by the Mainland authorities are potentially wider than those by Hong Kong authorities. In particular, the concept of administrative detention is alien to Hong Kong. To exercise such powers in Hong Kong are clearly incompatible with many fundamental human rights protected by the Basic Law, such as the rights against arbitrary arrest and detention and the rights to confidential legal advice and fair hearing.
29. To apply national criminal law in Hong Kong would not only contravene Articles 17, 18 and 19; in so far as the MPA is concerned, it also violates other provisions of the Basic Law which afford people within Hong Kong territory protection of fundamental human rights, including but not limited to, Articles 28, 35 and 39.
D.2 Article 20 of the Basic Law cannot salvage the legality of the Government’s proposal
30. The Government has attempted to salvage the legality of its proposal by receiving additional powers from the NPCSC allegedly pursuant to Article 20 of the Basic Law to set up such MPA and confer jurisdiction upon the Mainland authorities to exercise national laws within the MPA.
31. The PLG is of the view that any additional power that Hong Kong may be granted by the NPCSC under Article 20 of the Basic Law must be subject to and must therefore not contravene other provisions of the Basic Law. To do otherwise would erode the integrity and consistency of the Basic Law and make a mockery of its very existence. That which is unconstitutional cannot be made constitutional by a sleight of hand. It would be in breach of the basic policies of “One Country Two Systems” and high degree of autonomy to be practiced in the Hong Kong.
32. In any event the removal of jurisdiction from parts of its soil and to allow national laws to be applied in Hong Kong is not in substance additional powers conferred upon Hong Kong. It is exactly the opposite, namely removing powers and jurisdiction from Hong Kong. Article 20 should not be used to cloak the actual derogation of powers from Hong Kong and the direct breaches of provisions of the Basic Law.
33. The Government has in its proposal used the arrangement at Shenzhen Bay Port as a precedent for demarcating a “port area” for the counterpart to exercise jurisdiction and for Hong Kong to be granted additional powers pursuant to Article 20.5
34. However, to use the Shenzhen Bay Port as a precedent is not only inappropriate but also misleading for the following reasons:-
(1) Basic Law does not apply to Shenzhen Bay area which has always been part of the Mainland. On the contrary, the soils of the West Kowloon Station and the tunnel of the XRL have always within Hong Kong territory where the Basic Law has since 1 st July 1997 applied.
(2) The Government has expressly promised when it answered questions from Legco members during the deliberation of the Shenzhen Bay Port Hong Kong Port Area Bill in 2007 that any additional powers granted under Article 20 “have to be consistent with the Basic Law, and cannot deprive the HKSAR of the rights protected under the Basic Law.”6 As analysed above, the current Government Proposal to be granted “additional powers” by virtue of Article 20 contravenes various fundamental articles of the Basic Law and will deprive the HKSAR of the rights protected under the Basic Law. The current Government Proposal is therefore exactly what the Government explicitly stated that it is not allowed to do under Article 20.
35. We are additionally concerned that the ultimate object of the Government’s proposal in relation to the MPA appears not to be the ensuring of its adherence to the Basic Law. Rather, by making the NPCSC a central part of its legal mechanism for implementing the MPA, the Government is merely seeking to take the question of adherence to the Basic Law away from the Hong Kong Courts. This would be done by virtue of the assertion that any decision of the NPCSC under Article 20 of the Basic Law to approve the creation and implementation of the MPA (and any local legislation falling under it) would constitute or otherwise flow from an “act of state” over which the Hong Kong Courts have no jurisdiction.7
36. It is worrying that such invocation of Article 20 of the Basic Law gives the NPCSC yet another means of determining the content of the Basic Law and the scope of Hong Kong laws, effectively amounting to a rule by decree. This follows the NPCSC’s recent use of its Basic Law interpretation powers Article 158 of the Basic Law in December 2016 not only to interpret the meaning of oath-taking requirements under Article 104 of the Basic Law, but also to make specific prescriptions on oath-taking which were matters of local Hong Kong law. Taken together, these developments create concerns about future legal and constitutional certainty in Hong Kong. Such certainty is in turn an essential ingredient of the rule of law, which is fundamental to Hong Kong maintenance of its status as an international financial centre.
37. In sum, the Government’s proposal in relation to the MPA would be in breach of the spirit of “One Country Two Systems” and the high degree of autonomy afforded to the HKSAR guaranteed by the Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration, as well as their express and unambiguous provisions.
E. Comparison with Arrangements between Foreign Countries and between the Mainland and Hong Kong
38. The Government has referred to the arrangements between foreign countries, such as those between the United States and Canada, and between the United Kingdom and France for the Eurostar train. It also referred to the customs and immigration arrangements between the Mainland and Hong Kong at Shenzhen Bay. In referring to these examples, the Government has sought to suggest that its proposal in relation to the MPA is commonly found elsewhere and ought not be controversial. However, the PLG notes that these arrangements are not legally and constitutionally comparable to that which exist in relation to the proposed MPA:
(1) The arrangements between the United States and Canada and between the United Kingdom and France involve independent sovereign nations which enjoy sovereign powers to legislate for their countries. By contrast, both the Mainland and Hong Kong administrations are bound by and must observe the Basic Law. Any similar arrangement would contravene the spirit and provisions of the Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration which guarantee “One Country Two Systems” and a high degree of autonomy to be practiced in Hong Kong as explained above.
(2) As for the Shenzhen Bay scenario, where Hong Kong law applies in a land area belonging to the Mainland, that differs from the currently proposed MPA scenario. There is no constitutional prohibition on such an arrangement on Mainland territory, whereas as noted above, the Basic Law clearly prohibits such an arrangement in relation to the application of Mainland laws in Hong Kong.
39. In so far as the North American and European examples cited above are concerned, we also note (although these points do not go to the fundamental question of constitutionality in the Hong Kong context as mentioned above) that the sovereign states that have implemented such arrangements share similar standards and afford similar protections on human rights. They can thus be confident that the human rights of its citizens would not be substantively prejudiced even where the officials of another state exercise rights of arrest or detention within the restricted areas for border control and customs. If suffices to mention for present purposes that a comparable degree of similarity in rights protection simply do not exist as between the Mainland and Hong Kong.
40. We also note, for completeness, potentially referable but more restrictive immigration and customs arrangements reached between other countries:.
(1) As between Singapore and Malaysia northbound passengers taking the Malaysian Railway may clear both Singapore’s and Malaysia’s custom and immigration at Woodland Train Checkpoint (in Singapore), but southbound passengers have to clear Malaysian custom and immigration at Johar Bahru (in Malaysia) and then Singapore custom and immigration at Woodland Train Checkpoint. This arrangement arose from a set of unique historical and legal circumstances as between Singapore and Malaysia subsisting from the time of Singapore’s independence, and in any event these states do not have comparable provisions in their constitutions as those referred to above in the Basic Law.
(2) Another example is the high-speed railway, the Allegro Express, between Finland and Russia. It connects between Helsinki, the capital of Finland, and St. Petersburg in Russia. Between the two terminals, there are 4 additional stops in Finland, and 1 additional stop in Russia. Both countries retain their immigration and customs control. However, physical control points are only installed at one additional stop in Finland (the one closest to the border) and at the additional stop in Russia for passengers boarding and alighting at the two respective stops. For all other passengers travelling to and from the terminals or other additional stops, the officials from both countries would carry out immigration and customs controls on board the trains (“on-board clearance”). Such an arrangement would substantially reduce the time required for passengers to queue up for border controls (except for passengers boarding at the last or alighting at the first stop), and does not involve any jurisdictional issue.
F. Comparison with Situations involving Consulates
41. There have been suggestions that the proposal is akin to the lease of land to foreign consulates, which are immune from interference by the HKSAR authorities.
42. However, we take the view that the situation involving foreign consulates is very different from the current context and not comparable for the following reasons:
(1) The immunity and privileges enjoyed by foreign consulates are matters of foreign affairs which the Central Government has exclusive power and control under the Basic Law. As such, the “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities” (the “Regulations”) being a piece of national law was included in Annex III of the Basic Law. The local legislation which gives effect to this piece of national law is the Consular Relations Ordinance, Cap. 557 (“CRO”). Both are promulgated to give effect to the articles of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations which the PRC is a signatory (“Vienna Convention”).
(2) Aside from the protection of immunity for consular officers, the Vienna Convention, the Regulation and the CRO provide that consular premises are inviolable. Hence, local officials or law enforcement agencies cannot freely enter into such premises to exercise their functions and duties. However, the premises being inviolable does not mean that the laws of the HKSAR do not apply in those premises. To the contrary, the laws of Hong Kong still apply in those premises and the HKSAR officials may enter such premises to enforce the same with the consent of the subject consulate-general. Therefore, any local people committing offences in those premises can be arrested by Hong Kong police and prosecuted in Hong Kong courts.
(3) Under the Vienna Convention, the Regulation and the CRO, the consular officers are entitled to carry out consular functions, e.g. issuing visas/passports and taking evidence in accordance with international arrangements, in the consular premises. However, such consular functions do not include Customs control or criminal jurisdiction.
43. In the premises, the situation with consulate premises is not comparable with the Government’s proposal which involves the exercise of customs law and criminal law within the West Kowloon Station and on operating trains.
G. Alternative Methods
44. There are obvious alternative methods to implement the boundary controls without contravening the Basic Law and sacrificing the rule of law, e.g. installing control points at the stations in Guangzhou and Shenzhen which the Government had previously stated that spaces had been reserved for the same.8
45. The Government has stated in its proposal that it considered all alternative proposals not feasible or economically viable.
46. For example, the Government declined the idea of on-board clearance due to physical limitation of space on the trains and short journey time between Hong Kong and Futian. 9 The Government also considered the traditional separate-location arrangement undesirable. 10
47. However, it seems that the Government has not considered a combined mode of the on-board clearance and separate-location arrangement which has been adopted in the Finland/Russia as noted above. If a similar arrangement is adopted for XRL between Hong Kong and the Mainland, for trains starting from/ending up in the Mainland outside Guangdong province, on-board clearance can be effected which journey time would be long and physical space on trains is a matter not difficult to resolve. Such an arrangement would also save passengers time from queuing up at the Mainland boundary controls. For trains travelling to Shenzhen or Guangzhou, the traditional separate-location arrangement may be adopted.
48. Such a combined mode seems feasible albeit involving slightly higher costs for the Mainland authorities. However, such an operating mode would not involve the jurisdictional issues or contravene the Basic Law as the current proposal does.
49. Thus, there do exist other alternative methods which do not contravene the Basic Law and are feasible despite higher costs involved or lower economic convenience. It is not for the PLG, as a group of lawyers and law students, to endorse any particular alternative method from a logistical perspective. Nonetheless, the PLG urges the Government to explore all possibilities in alternative methods which comply with the spirit and provisions of the Basic Law.
Progressive Lawyers Group
18 September 2017
1 The Basic Law provides as follows: Article 2 authorises Hong Kong to exercise ‘a high degree of autonomy, executive, legislative and independent judicial power’; Article 3 states that executive and legislative positions ‘shall be composed of permanent residents of Hong Kong’; Article 12 provides that Hong Kong as a local administrative region of the PRC shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy; Article 16 sanctions the executive to conduct regional administrative affairs on its own; Article 17 grants the legislature with powers to make laws for the region; Article 19 vests Hong Kong with an independent judiciary and powers of final adjudication; Article 22 prevents the Central Government from interfering in the affairs which Hong Kong administers on its own in accordance with the Basic Law; Article 23 grants Hong Kong the power to enact laws on state security laws; Article 26 confers a right upon residents to vote and stand for election; Articles 27 to 34 guarantee fundamental rights; Article 39 guarantees and protects the application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the“ICCPR”) in Hong Kong; Article 159 provides that ‘no amendment to this Law shall contravene the established basic policies [which is a reference to the Joint Declaration] of the PRC regarding Hong Kong.’ In addition Hong Kong has its own regional flag and emblem, independent finance and taxation systems.
2 Chapter VII Basic Law provides that Hong Kong has autonomy over some areas of external affairs,
e.g. trade relations in the WTO, power to enter into bilateral treaties concerning economic matters.
3 Article 13 and 14 of the Basic Law.
4 Such legislative power is regulated in more details in Articles 63 to 79 of the Basic Law.
5 Para. 47 of the Government paper tabled for discussion by the Legco <
6 Para. 20 of the Report of the Bills Committee
<http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/bc/bc55/reports/bc550425cb2-1626-e.pdf> and the
government’s press release of the speech given by Ambrose Lee Siu Kwong, the then Secretary for
Security, on 25th April 2007 <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200704/25/P200704250279.htm>
7 HKSAR v Ma Wai Kwan  HKLRD 761; Ng Ka Ling and Others v Director of Immigration (No 2)
 1 HKLRD 577.
8 Para. 19 of the Legislative Council Brief dated 22 April 2008
9 Paras. 17-18 of Annex to Paper tabled for Legco
10 Paras. 19-23 of Annex to Paper tabled for Legco